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NOTES
TYING ARRANGEMENTS AND THE COMPUTER
INDUSTRY: DIGID YNE CORP. V. DATA
GENERAL CORP.
In the recent case of Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., I the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that Data
General's refusal to license its copyrighted computer software to those
who did not purchase its hardware was an unlawful tying arrangement. 2
The court of appeals found that Data General's market power in the
market for the tying product-computer software-was sufficient to es-
tablish a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act 3 and
section 3 of the Clayton Act.4 The trial court had already found that
there was no business justification for Data General's actions, 5 and this
determination was affirmed by the court of appeals.6 With two Justices
filing a written dissent, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case.7
The Data General decision opens many firms in the highly competitive
computer industry to potential antitrust liability for "tying" hardware
and software products.
This note reviews the law of tying arrangements and the opinions in
the Data General case.8 The note then examines the Ninth Circuit's rea-
soning in light of recent changes in the attitudes of courts, legal commen-
tators, and economists toward the possible efficiency effects of tying
arrangements. It finds that the Data General holding can be faulted on
1. 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3534 (1985).
2. Id. at 1338.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) provides, in relevant part, that "[e]very contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."
4. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982) provides, in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce,
to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, . . . whether patented or unpatented,
* * . on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof
shall not use or deal in the goods. . . of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller,
where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract. . . may be to substantially lessen competi-
tion or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
5. Data General, 734 F.2d at 1339 n.1.
6. Id. at 1343-44, 1347.
7. 105 S. Ct. 3534 (1985).
8. See infra notes 12-39 and accompanying text.
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several grounds. First, the Ninth Circuit failed to require a showing of
market power sufficient to invoke the per se rule.9 Second, the presump-
tion of market power arising from copyright proprietorship should be
treated as rebuttable, or merely as persuasive evidence, rather than as an
irrebuttable presumption.10 Finally, the trial court did not give adequate
consideration to the possible business justifications for selling computer
hardware and software as a single package. I Because it applied mechan-
ical rules to complex economic issues, the Ninth Circuit imposed liability
without a sufficient showing that competition or consumer welfare was
adversely affected by the tying arrangement. Data General thus threat-
ens to impose treble damage liability on all firms in the computer indus-
try that engage in the common practice of selling software-hardware
packages. The note concludes that the imposition of such liability is un-
justified in light of Supreme Court precedent and the underlying pur-
poses of the antitrust laws.
I. THE PER SE RULE AGAINST TYING ARRANGEMENTS
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits "[e]very contract, combina-
tion in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce."' 2 Cases arising under section 1 are generally decided
under the "rule of reason."' 13 This standard "requires the factfinder to
decide whether under all the circumstances of the case the restrictive
practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition."' 14 If a re-
straint is found to promote competition, it is upheld. 15 In the interest of
judicial economy, however, courts have fashioned per se rules against
practices that are "manifestly anticompetitive."' 6 Where this rule is
9. See infra notes 40-102 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 103-33 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 134-84 and accompanying text.
12. Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209, 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C § I
(1982)).
13. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 342-43 (1982); Standard Oil Co.
v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911). For a discussion of the nature and history of the rule of
reason, see National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688-92 (1978).
14. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982) (citing Chicago Bd.
of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (Brandeis, J.)).
15. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978).
16. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 (1977); see also Jefferson
Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1560 n.25 (1984) (discussing rationale for per se
rules in antitrust cases). The per se rule makes certain activities, including certain tying arrange-
ments, illegal without any showing of unreasonable effect on competition. Fortner Enters. v. United
States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 498 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Fortner I]; Northern Pac. Ry. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958) ("[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of
their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to
be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have
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applied, a practice is condemned without consideration of its
reasonableness. 17
A tying arrangement, or "tie-in," is "an agreement by a party to sell
one product but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a
different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase
that product from any other supplier." 18 The courts have held that the
use of market power or leverage in one market to influence another mar-
ket "generally serve[s] no legitimate business purpose that cannot be
achieved in some less restrictive way."' 19 As a result, tying arrangements
are assumed to be anticompetitive and are therefore condemned as per se
violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act and section 3 of the Clayton
Act.20
It is important to note, however, that the courts have normally ap-
plied a "partial per se" rule to tying arrangements: 21
caused or the business excuse for their use."). For a discussion of the validity of the per se rule
against tie-ins, see infra notes 60-77 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 343-44 (1982); Broad-
cast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1979); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433
U.S. 36, 49-50 (1977); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). The rationale for
the per se rule is to avoid burdensome market inquiry "where the likelihood of anticompetitiv.e
conduct is so great as to render unjustified the costs of determining whether the particular case at bar
involves anticompetitive conduct." Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551,
1560 n.25 (1984).
18. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
19. Fortner I, 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969). The leverage theory is discussed and criticized infra
notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
20. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (tying arrangements are per se
violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396
(1947) ("[I]t is unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial market."). An
extensive legislative and case history supports the per se rule against tying arrangements. See Jeffer-
son Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1557 nn.14-15 (1984) (citing cases and
legislative history supporting the per se rule).
21. E.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1558-61 (1984) (discuss-
ing necessary conditions for the application of the per se rule against tie-ins); Fortner I, 394 U.S.
495, 498 (1969) (tie-ins are per se illegal, "at least when certain prerequisites are met"). As the
Supreme Court recently noted:
There is often no bright line separating per se from Rule of Reason analysis. Per se rules
may require considerable inquiry into market conditions before the evidence justifies a pre-
sumption of anticompetitive conduct. For example, although the Court has spoken of a
"per se" rule against tying arrangements, it has also recognized that tying may have
procompetitive justifications that make it inappropriate to condemn without considerable
market analysis.
NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2962 n.26 (1984); see ABA ANTITRUST SECTION,
ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 89-90 (2d ed. 1984) (some business justifications are considered
by the courts despite the per se rule); R. GIVENS, ANTITRUST: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH § 9.02
(1983) (discussing market power and business justification issues that are considered despite per se
label); ANTITRUST ADVISER 94 (C. Hills 2d ed. 1978) (courts apply near-per se or pseudo-per se
rule) [hereinafter cited as C. HILLS]; W. HOLMES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST
LAW § 8.02, at 5 (1983) (reference to per se standard somewhat misleading); E. ROCKEFELLER,
ANTITRUST COUNSELING FOR THE 1980s, at 82-83 (1983) (courts consider business justifications).
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[A]s a practical matter, the need to conduct a number of market-re-
lated inquiries in order to invoke the per se rule and the willingness of
the courts to consider justifications for the challenged conduct result in
an analysis of economic effect that in some respects approaches a rule
of reason inquiry. 22
In order to invoke this partial per se rule, the plaintiff must prove the
following: (1) there are two separate products; (2) the sale of one prod-
uct is conditioned on or "tied" to the sale of the other product; (3) the
seller has enough market power in the market for the tying product "to
restrain competition appreciably" in the market for the tied product; and
(4) a substantial amount of commerce in the tied product is affected by
the tie-in.23 Courts of appeals in several circuits have also required the
plaintiff to establish that competition in the market for the tied product
has actually been foreclosed.24
A large number of cases illustrate the application of the partial per se rule. See, e.g., Fortner I, 394
U.S. 495, 506 (1969) ("It may turn out [on remand] that the arrangement here serves legitimate
business purposes...."); Betaseed, Inc. v. U. & I., Inc., 681 F.2d 1203, 1215 (9th Cir. 1982) (per
se rule against tying still "permits the defendant to offer justifications for undertaking the tie") (quot-
ing Phonetele, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 664 F.2d 716, 738-39 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1145 (1983)); Hirsh v. Martindale-Hubbell, Inc., 674 F.2d 1343, 1347 nn.16-17 (9th Cir.)
(noting that even under per se rule procompetitive nature of a tie-in is considered), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 973 (1982); David R. McGeorge Car Co. v. Leyland Motor Sales, Inc., 504 F.2d 52, 58 (4th Cir.
1974) (transaction "does not fall within that classification of arrangements which have no lawful
business objective"), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992 (1975); Polytechnic Data Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 362
F. Supp. 1, 9 (N.D. Il1. 1973) (accepting efficiency justification for tie-in); Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332
F.2d 505, 519-20 (2d Cir. 1964) (protection of goodwill accepted as business justification), cert. dis-
missed, 381 U.S. 125 (1965); Baker v. Simmons Co., 307 F.2d 458, 468-69 (1st Cir. 1962) (upholding
tie-in that maintained trademark holder's goodwill); Dehydrating Process Co. v. A. 0. Smith Corp.,
292 F.2d 653, 655-57 (Ist Cir.) (accepting goodwill/efficiency justification), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
931 (1961); United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960) (accepting "de-
veloping industry" justification in case of tie-in of CATV equipment and service), afj'd per curiam,
365 U.S. 567 (1961).
22. ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 21, at 77.
23. See Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., 734 F.2d 1336, 1338 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied, 105 S. Ct. 3534 (1985); see also Fortner I, 394 U.S. 495, 498-99 (1969); Hirsh v. Martindale-
Hubbell, Inc., 674 F.2d 1343, 1346-47 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 973 (1982). The elements of
the per se rule are generally the same for Clayton and Sherman Act suits. See Jefferson Parish Hosp.
Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1564 n.39 (1984) ("[W]ith respect to the definition of tying tie
standards used by the two statutes are the same."); Spartan Grain & Mill Co. v. Ayers, 581 F.2d 419,
428 (5th Cir. 1978) (market power is required under both Sherman and Clayton Acts), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 831 (1979); Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1214 (9th Cir. 1977) (ele-
ments of per se rule for Sherman and Clayton Acts appear "virtually identical"); E. ROCKEFELLER,
supra note 21, at 81 (similar standards applied); E. KINTNER, AN ANTITRUST PRIMER 55 (1964)
("difference [in elements of the per se rule] may no longer exist in the field of tie-in sales"). Some
earlier decisions interpreted the Clayton Act as condemning tying arrangements on a lesser showing
than that required under section I of the Sherman Act. See, e.g., Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v.
United States, 345 U.S. 594, 608-09 (1953).
24. E.g., Shop & Save Food Mkts., Inc. v. Pneumo Corp., 683 F.2d 27, 30 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1038 (1982); Bob Maxfield, Inc. v. American Motors Corp., 637 F.2d 1033, 1037
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 (1981); Yentsch v. Texaco, Inc., 630 F.2d 46, 57-58 (2d Cir.
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II. DIGIDYNE CORP. V. DATA GENERAL CORP.
Data General is one of approximately one hundred manufacturers
of general-purpose minicomputers and microprocessors. It sells a central
processing unit (CPU) called NOVA and an accompanying line of oper-
ating system software called RDOS. Digidyne Corp. and the other plain-
tiffs are manufacturers of competing CPUs (known as NOVA emulators)
that are compatible with the RDOS software. After Data General re-
fused to license its software for use with the NOVA emulators, Digidyne
Corp. and other competitors filed suit, alleging that Data General's re-
quirement that purchasers of RDOS also buy NOVA was a tying ar-
rangement in violation of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.25
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs
on three of the four elements of the per se rule. The trial court found
that the software and the CPU were separate products, 26 purchasers were
required to buy both,27 and the tie-in affected a "not insubstantial"
amount of interstate commerce.28 In addition, the court rejected three
1980); Driskill v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Inc., 498 F.2d 321, 323 (5th Cir. 1974); Coniglio v.
Highway Servs., Inc., 495 F.2d 1286, 1291-92 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1022 (1974); see also
Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Ass'n, 680 F.2d 66, 67 (9th Cir.) (membership link between a
national dental association and local and state societies not a tying arrangement because there is no
market in the "tied product" for the challenged membership requirements to restrain), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 837 (1982); Community Builders, Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 652 F.2d 823, 830 (9th Cir. 1981)
(municipality's conditioning of building permit on water hookup not a tying arrangement because no
competitive market for water services existed). For a discussion of the elements of the per se rule in
tie-in cases, see R. GIVENS, supra note 21, § 9.02.
25. In re Data General Corp. Antitrust Litig., 529 F. Supp. 801, 805 (N.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd in
part, 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3534 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Data
General II].
26. In re Data General Corp. Antitrust Litig., 490 F. Supp. 1089, 1104-06 (N.D. Cal. 1980),
affd in relevant part, 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3534 (1985) [hereinafter
cited as Data General I]. The court concluded that, despite the fact that the two products must be
used together, the CPU and the software need not come from the same seller. Id. Whether there are
two separate products depends upon the existence of two separate product markets, not upon the
functional relationship between the two products. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S.
Ct. 1551, 1562 (1984); see infra note 183. Although seemingly straightforward, the standards for
determining whether two products are indeed separate are vague. See R. POSNER, ANTITRUST
LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 181 (1976) (no logical way to determine whether there are one
or two products unless cost justifications are implicitly taken into account).
27. Data General I, 490 F. Supp. at 1107.
28. Id. at 1116-17. The court also found that the plaintiffs had shown that they had suffered
antitrust injury as a result of the defendant's tying practices. Id. at 1117-19.
Under the "not insubstantial" test, anything more than a de minimis dollar amount is sufficient.
Fortner I, 394 U.S. 495, 501 (1969). Dollar volumes in the $50,000 to $100,000 range have been
regarded as sufficient. See Aamco Automatic Transmissions v. Tayloe, 407 F. Supp. 430, 436 (E.D.
Pa. 1916).
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business justifications offered by Data General.29 A jury trial was held
on the limited issue of whether there was sufficient economic power in
the tying product market to restrain competition appreciably in the mar-
ket for the tied product.30 The jury found that Data General possessed
sufficient economic power, but the trial court granted Data General's
motion for a judgment n.o.v. 31 The court concluded that "the evidence
cannot reasonably support a finding that Data General possessed eco-
nomic power" sufficient to restrain competition.32
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed
the district court's conclusion on the sufficiency of market power.33 To
establish a per se case, the court reasoned, the plaintiff need not show
"power over the whole market for the tying product," but merely the
ability to induce some customers to purchase the second product when
they would not have done so in a competitive market. 34 The court of
appeals found that Data General had the ability to "force" buyers to
accept the tying arrangement, and justified this finding on several
grounds. First, it found that "defendant's RDOS was distinctive and
particularly desirable to a substantial number of buyers."' 35 Second, the
court recited the rule that a defendant's possession of a copyright on the
tying product creates a presumption of market power.36 Finally, having
found that RDOS was "unique as a matter of law," the court asserted
that the market power thus conferred on Data General was magnified
because buyers were "locked in."' 37 The lock-in allegedly gave Data
29. Data General I, 490 F. Supp. 1089, 1120-24 (N.D. Cal. 1980), afFd in relevant part, 734
F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3534 (1985). The business justification question is
discussed infra notes 134-84 and accompanying text.
30. Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., 734 F.2d 1336, 1338 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 3534 (1985).
31. Data General II, 529 F. Supp. at 821. In the alternative, the court granted a motion for a
new trial. Id.
32. Id.
33. Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., 734 F.2d 1336, 1346-47 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied, 105 S. Ct. 3534 (1985). The Ninth Circuit's decision can be partly explained by its deference to
the jury's conclusion at trial. See id. at 1341 (finding "substantial evidence" to support the jury's
findings). Nevertheless, the court went further, holding that uniqueness was shown "as a matter of
law." Id. at 1342-43. The court stated its opinion in broad language, and apparently did not intend
to limit the decision to its facts.
34. Id. at 1341 (citing Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1559 n.20
(1984)).
35. Data General, 734 F.2d at 1341.
36. Id at 134142; see Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1560 (1984)
("it is fair to presume" market power from patents and other legal monopolies); United States v.
Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962) (same); see also United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., 429
U.S. 610, 620 (1977) (copyright confers "some advantage[s] not shared by. . .competitors in the
market for the tying product") [hereinafter cited as Fortner II].
37. Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., 734 F.2d 1336, 1342-43 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied, 105 S. Ct. 3534 (1985).
1032 (Vol. 1985:1027
TYING ARRANGEMENTS
General power over its customers, companies that build complete com-
puter systems around RDOS. Such a purchaser would presumably be
forced to abandon its entire computer system if it switched to a compet-
ing, and incompatible, brand of software. 38 Hence, the expense and in-
convenience involved in switching from RDOS to a competing operating
system gave Data General an advantage not shared by its competitors. 39
III. MARKET POWER IN TYING CASES
The Data General court's willingness to impose per se liability and
treble damages4° was based essentially on two findings: (1) many buyers
accepted Data General's mandatory software-hardware package and (2)
the tying product, RDOS, was copyrighted. Software-hardware pack-
ages are common in the computer industry.41 Because computer hard-
ware and software are generally protected by patents and copyrights,
respectively,42 many computer manufacturers may be exposed to anti-
trust liability as a result of Data General. Yet these companies face in-
tense competition from a large number of American and foreign
producers.43 Rapid technological change encourages the constant re-
placement of leading products with newer and more advanced competi-
tors.44 The Ninth Circuit's finding -of market power was inadequate
under the legal rules governing tying arrangements and in light of the
economic underpinnings of the antitrust laws. It is widely acknowledged
that, in defining the legal standards for market power, the law should
recognize the economic realities of the marketplace. 45 A more stringent
38. Id. The lock-in theory is criticized infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
39. See Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., 734 F.2d 1336, 1342-43 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 3534 (1985).
40. Treble damages are authorized by 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982) ("[A]ny person who shall be
injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws . . . shall
recover threefold the damages by him sustained ....").
41. The specialized computer magazines describe some of the numerous software-hardware
packages that are offered on the market. E.g., COMPUTER BUYER'S GUIDE & HANDBOOK, Jan.
1985, at 40, 43-105; Enright, Preview: The Kaypro 16, PROFILES, Feb. 1985, at 74, 76, 79.
42. Computer programs (software) receive limited copyright protection. See Data General II,
529 F. Supp. 801, 816 (N.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd in part on other grounds, 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3534 (1985). See generally Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case
Against Copyright Protection for Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J.
663.
43. In Data General II, for example, the trial court noted that Data General had over one
hundred competitors in the market for operating system software. Data General II, 529 F. Supp. at
813. The market was described as "broad, dynamic, [and] highly competitive." Id.
44. See id.
45. A recognition that the intellectual and legal basis of the antitrust laws lies in economic
theory is crucial. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1559-60
(1984) (discussing efficiency and consumer welfare as goals of the antitrust laws); Arizona v. Mari-
copa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 366-67 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting) (the courts are
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and rigorous definition of market power would prevent the imposition of
liability on firms that do not have the economic power to restrain compe-
tition. It would also be consistent with recent Supreme Court rulings
that, unlike Data General, emphasize the importance of market power in
deciding antitrust cases.
A. The Importance of Market Power: Traditional
and Economic Approaches.
The requirement of a strong showing of market power is consistent
with the traditional "leverage" rationale for attacking tying arrange-
ments. As Justice White has noted, leverage "is the use of power over
one product to attain power over another, or otherwise distort freedom
of trade and competition in the second product."' 46 If there is no eco-
nomic power or control over the tying product market, one seller's deci-
sion to sell two products as a package does not have any anticompetitive
bound to interpret the broad mandate of the antitrust laws for the benefit of consumers); Reiter v.
Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (antitrust laws are a "consumer welfare prescription");
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979) (discussing the importance of efficiency
effects in determining the applicability of the per se rule); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,
Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (antitrust should protect competition, not competitors); 1 P. AREEDA
& D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW § 104 (1978) (economic efficiency is paramount consideration in
antitrust cases); R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 81-89 (1978) (same); W. LETWIN, LAW AND
ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA 3 (1965) (describing the Sherman Act as "economic policy [to
facilitate competition] imposed by a general law"); Holmes, Antitrust as a Flexible Charter for Com-
petitive Markets, in ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION AND THE MARKET
SYSTEM 17, 18 (1979) ("[Tjhe central and fundamental objective of the antitrust laws is to ensure the
preservation and perpetuation of the competitive market economy."); Bork, Legislative Intent and
the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7, 7 (1966) (Congress's intent in passing Sherman Act
was to promote consumer welfare). In a landmark decision, the Supreme Court recognized the
economic evidence favoring territorial restrictions on franchises and therefore overturned the per se
rule against that form of vertical restraint. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36,
54-58 (1977); see R. GIVENS, supra note 21, § 31.01 ("The increased recognition of the importance
of economic factors in antitrust . . . contributed to the expansion of the rule of reason in the GTE
Sylvania case and the notion thatperse rules only apply where their purposes also apply."); William-
son, Symposium on Antitrust Law and Economics: Introduction, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 918, 920 (1979)
(GTE Sylvania illustrates the Court's willingness to consider efficiency and transaction-cost effects of
business practices).
The Supreme Court was also receptive to economic efficiency arguments in a recent case involv-
ing resale price maintenance. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 762 (1984)
(discussing the importance of actual market impact); see also Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements
and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135, 169-71 (1984) (Monsanto "largely reads as if the
Court has adopted the economic approach to restricted distribution."). Monsanto also casts doubt
on the applicability of the per se rule to resale price maintenance. See Easterbrook, supra, at 171.
46. Fortner I, 394 U.S. 495, 512-14 (1969) (White, J., dissenting); see Jefferson Parish Hosp.
Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1558 (1984). One commentator has argued that the leverage
theory of tie-ins is similar to the transfer-of-power theory in predatory pricing. See C. HILLS, supra
note 21, at 192-93 (W. Liebeler ed. Supp. 1984).
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effects.47 In Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde,48 for exam-
ple, the Supreme Court refused to apply the per se rule against a hospi-
tal's requirement that its patients purchase preselected anesthesiological
services. Viewing market power as a necessary condition for the exist-
ence of anticompetitive "forcing," 49 the court held that per se treatment
is inappropriate where no strong showing of market power is made.50
Although still influential, the leverage view of tie-ins has been
widely criticized by commentators and economists.51 George Stigler's
47. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1558, 1565 (1984); see also id.
at 1571-72 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that, absent market power in tying product market,
tie-in will in fact be "pro-competitive"); Fortner II, 429 U.S. 610, 620 (1977) (raising issue of
whether seller has power within the tying product market to raise prices or require purchasers to
accept burdensome terms); Fortner I, 394 U.S. 495, 503-04 (1969) ("[Ihe proper focus of concern is
whether the seller has the power to raise prices, or impose other burdensome terms such as a tie-in,
with respect to any appreciable number of buyers within the market."). One commentator has noted
that "when. . .firms lack market power... they cannot sustain deleterious practices. Rival firms
will offer the consumers better deals. The process of rivalry is sufficient insurance. Rivals' better
offers will stamp out bad practices faster than the judicial process can." Easterbrook, supra note 45,
at 159. A tie-in by a firm with little or no market power can benefit consumers by increasing the
number of price-quality options available, facilitating the introduction of new products, alleviating
imperfect information problems, and frustrating efforts to form cartels. See id. at 146, 149-50.
48. 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984).
49. Id. at 1558-60.
50. Id. at 1560-61, 1565.
51. "Although the replacement of leverage by price discrimination in the theory of tie-ins has
been a part of the economic literature for almost twenty years, it has had virtually no impact on
public policy." R. POSNER, supra note 26, at 174 (footnote omitted); see D. ARMENTANO, ANTI-
TRUST AND MONOPOLY: ANATOMY OF A POLICY FAILURE 200 (1982) ("[T]here is no practical
way to 'leverage' market power from one market to another."); R. BORK, supra note 45, at 372
("The law's theory of tying arrangements is merely another example of the discredited transfer-of-
power theory, and perhaps no other variety of that theory has been so thoroughly and repeatedly
demolished in the legal and economic literature."); W. BOWMAN, PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW,
at ix, 55-58, 157-58 (1973) (criticizing the leverage theory in the patent-antitrust cases); Easterbrook,
supra note 45, at 143-44 (criticizing the leverage theory); D. GIFFORD & L. RASKIND, FEDERAL
ANTITRUST LAW 183 (1983) (criticizing "leverage" as assuming ability to transfer or extend market
power); C. HILLS, supra note 21, at 192-94 (W. Liebeler ed. 1984 Supp.) (leverage view of tie-ins is
subject to increasing challenge); R. POSNER, supra note 26, at 172 ("One striking deficiency of the
traditional, 'leverage' theory of tie-ins. . . is the failure to require any proof that a monopoly of the
tied product is even a remotely plausible consequence of the tie-in."); Hovenkamp, Tying Arrange-
ments and Class Actions, 36 VAND. L. REV. 213, 227-31 (1983) (concluding that the leverage theory
"has no economic merit" and is "fallacious"); Williamson, supra note 45, at 919 (describing Harvard
School's leverage theory as "discredited"). For a general discussion of the leverage theory, see P.
AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 735 (3d ed. 1981); Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage
Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957); Burstein, A Theory of Full-Line Forcing, 55 Nw. U.L. REV. 62
(1960); Markovits, Tie-ins, Reciprocity, and the Leverage Theory, 76 YALE L.J. 1397 (1967).
The notion that tie-ins are barriers to entry is a related notion that rests on the same premises as
the leverage theory. R. BORK, supra note 45, at 374-75; see W. BOWMAN, supra, at 118 ("The
'barriers to entry' argument. . . is again merely a variation of the leverage example."); R. POSNER,
supra note 26, at 176 (criticizing the entry barrier argument); Posner, The Chicago School of Anti-
trust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 929-30 (1979) (criticizing leverage and barrier to entry
theories).
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critique of United States v. Loew's Inc. 52 provides an example:
One film, Justice Goldberg cited Gone With the Wind, is worth
$10,000 to the buyer, while a second film, the Justice cited Getting
Gertie's Garter, is worthless to him. The seller could sell the one for
$10,000, and throw away the second, for no matter what its cost,
bygones are forever bygones. Instead the seller compels the buyer to
take both. But surely he can obtain no more than $10,000, since by
hypothesis this is the value of both films to the buyer. Why not, in
short, use his monopoly power directly on the desirable film? It seems
no more sensible, on this logic, to blockbook the two films than it
would be to compel the exhibitor to buy Gone With the Wind and
seven Ouija boards, again for $10,000.5 3
The weakness of the leverage theory has only recently been noted by the
courts:
The existence of a tied product normally does not increase the profit
that the seller with market power can extract from sales of the tying
product. A seller with a monopoly on flour, for example, cannot in-
crease the profit it can extract from flour consumers simply by forcing
them to buy sugar along with their flour. Counterintuitive though that
assertion may seem, it is easily demonstrated and widely accepted. 54
There are, of course, other anticompetitive purposes that may be
achieved by tying arrangements. Tie-ins may be used to evade price con-
trols or regulation;55 they may also serve as a means of enforcing price
discrimination through metering of consumer demand.5 6 These prac-
tices, however, can be carried out only if the firm has a great deal of
market power.57 In Data General as in Jefferson Parish Hospital 58 there
52. 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
53. Stigler, United States v. Loew's Inc.: A Note on Block-Booking, 1963 Sup. CT. REV. 152,
152-53, cited in R. BORK, supra note 45, at 374.
54. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1571 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (citation omitted) (emphasis in the original); see also Fortner I, 394 U.S. 495, 512 n.3
(1969) (White, J., dissenting) (noting limited applicability of leverage theory); Moore v. Jas. H. Mat-
thews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 1977) (recognizing that the leverage theory is ques-
tionable and concluding that the per se rule against tie-ins is invoked simply to avoid the more
complex rule-of-reason analysis).
55. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1567 n.47 (1984); id. at 1571
n.4 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 513 (White, J., dissenting); R. BORK, supra
note 45, at 376; R. POSNER, supra note 26, at 172 n.3; Blair & Finci, The Individual Coercion Doc-
trine and Tying Arrangements: An Economic Analysis, 10 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 531, 546-47 (1983);
Hovenkamp, supra note 51, at 232-35.
56. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1559, 1567 n.47 (1984); id. at
1571 n.4 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 617; Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 513 (White,
J., dissenting); R. BORK, supra note 45, at 376-78; R. POSNER, supra note 26, at 173-74; Bowman,
supra note 51, at 23-24; Posner, supra note 51, at 926; Blair & Finci, supra note 55, at 547-49;
Hovenkamp, supra note 51, at 247-52.
57. Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 620; Fortner I, 394 U.S, at 514; Hovenkamp, supra note 51, at 237.
Such use of market power could be proscribed by section 2 of the Sherman Act. See Jefferson Parish
Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1571 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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is no evidence that the defendant engaged in price discrimination.5 9
The crucial point is that both the leverage and the metering theories
require some showing of market power. Under the leverage theory, the
defendant must have enough power in the market for the tying product
to be able to project that power into another market. Market power is
also essential to the success of any price discrimination scheme.
B. The Per Se Rule and Market Power.
The per se rule conclusively presumes that certain activities are ille-
gal, and thus dispenses with the need for any extensive inquiry into the
reasonableness of the practice in individual cases. 60 The rule is intended
to apply where a practice is "manifestly anticompetitive 61 and there is a
"nearly universal view [that the practice is] subject to automatic condem-
nation under the Sherman Act, rather than to careful assessment under
the rule of reason."'62
The rationale for per se rules in antitrust law suggests that a more
demanding requirement of market power should be applied to tying cases
than is currently in use. The court in Jefferson Parish Hospital noted that
the rule is intended to obviate the need for detailed market inquiry in
cases where anticompetitive effect is nearly certain.63 In the case of tying
arrangements, leverage and price discrimination are both impossible
without market power. 4 A high threshold requirement of market power
would enable courts to pinpoint cases where anticompetitive effect is
most likely. Plaintiffs unable to meet this standard would justifiably be
forced to prove that the tie-in harms competition under the rule of reason
analysis.6 5
In the case of tie-ins used to evade government regulations, market power is not necessary; the
existence of government regulations prevents other competitors from lawfully responding to the use
of the tying arrangement. See Hovenkamp, supra note 51, at 235.
58. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1571 n.4 (1984).
59. See Data General II, 529 F. Supp. 801, 814-15 (N.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd in part on other
grounds, 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3534 (1985). Price discrimination is
nearly impossible where the quantity of tied product used is a fixed proportion of the quantity of the
tying product. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1567 n.47 (1984); see
Hovenkamp, supra note 51, at 240-44 ("Fixed proportion tying arrangements generally are unlikely
candidates for use as metering devices.").
60. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
61. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 (1977).
62. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 16 (1979).
63. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1560 n.25 (1984).
64. See supra notes 46-59 and accompanying text.
65. See Jefferson Parish Hosp., 104 S. Ct. at 1561 ("When. . . the seller does not have either
the degree or the kind of market power that enables him to force customers to purchase a second,
unwanted product. . . an antitrust violation can be established only by evidence of an unreasonable
restraint on competition. ... ).
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There is a second, and related, reason to require a strong showing of
market power and thus to narrow the scope of the per se rule. A growing
number of commentators have criticized the application of the per se rule
in any tie-in case. The rule is attacked primarily because it ignores evi-
dence of the efficiency effects of tie-ins. 66 Commentators have claimed
that economic analysis simply no longer supports the harsh view of tying
arrangements taken by some courts.67 Not only are the efficiency effects
of tie-ins coming to light, but the traditional leverage theory of tying
arrangements is being discredited at the same time.68
Although there is no "universal view" that tying arrangements are
anticompetitive, Jefferson Parish Hospital69 reaffirmed that "certain tying
arrangements" are unreasonable per se.70 The Court was strongly di-
vided in coming to this conclusion; four concurring Justices called for the
66. See D. ARMENTANO, supra note 51, at 225 ("A 'rule of reason' approach to tying arrange-
ments is certainly to be preferred to absolute illegality .... "); R. BORK, supra note 45, at 365
(antitrust treats tying arrangements as "utterly pernicious, despite the increasingly obtrusive fact
that it has found no adequate grounds for objecting to them at all"); R. POSNER, supra note 26, at
182 ("The prohibition against tie-ins ought to be radically curtailed, and in the absence of a general
prohibition of systematic price discrimination eliminated."); see also Dam, Fortner Enters. v. United
States Steel: "Neither a Borrower, Nor a Lender Be," 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 19 (per se rule fails to
provide economic standards for determining when tie-ins are harmful and when they are not), cited
in Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1563 n.33 (1984); Easterbrook, supra
note 45, at 144-45 (the situations in which tie-ins and other vertical restraints protect monopoly are
too rare to justify application of the per se rule); Comment, Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v.
Hyde: Time to Apply the Rule of Reason to Tying Arrangements, 70 IowA L. REV. 565, 577 (1985)
(consumer welfare best served by applying rule-of-reason analysis to tie-ins).
67. See, eg. C. HILLS, supra note 21, at 158 (Supp. 1983).
68. As Hills notes, the critique of the traditional leverage view involves two propositions. First,
the seller of a tying product cannot induce buyers to accept the tied product without providing a
discount on the price of the tying product. See id. at 158-59 (citing Fortner I, 394 U.S. 495, 513
(1969) (White, J., dissenting)). Moreover, "in the absence of price discrimination, a monopolist of
one product [market] cannot increase profits by tying a complementary (vertically related) product
to the product over which the monopoly is held." C. HILLS, supra note 21, at 159 (Supp. 1983); see
supra notes 51-59.
69. 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984).
70. Id. at 1556. The Court's response focused upon precedent: "It is far too late in the history
of our antitrust jurisprudence to question the proposition that certain tying arrangements . ., are
unreasonable 'per se.'" Id. Although the importance of precedent cannot be doubted, the majority
opinion in Jefferson Parish Hosp. brings to mind the words of Karl Llewellyn:
[C]ategories and concepts, once formulated and once they have entered into thought
processes, tend to take on an appearance of solidity, reality and inherent value which has
no foundation in experience. More than this: although originally formulated on the model
of at least some observed data, they tend, once they have entered into the organization of
thinking, both to suggest the presence of corresponding data when these data are not in
fact present, and to twist any fresh observation of data into conformity with the terms of
the categories. . . . It is peculiarly troublesome in regard to legal concepts, because of the
tendency of the crystallized legal concept to persist after the fact model from which the
concept was once derived has disappeared or changed out of recognition.
Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REv. 431, 453-54 (1930).
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abandonment of the per se rule.7' The majority opinion in Jefferson Par-
ish Hospital does not, however, preclude the requirement of a strong
showing of market power.7 2 The Court noted that market power "in
some abstract sense" will not suffice;7 3 market power in the economic
sense-control over price-must be proved.74
Given the strong economic arguments against the per se rule, the
best course would be to apply the rule only in cases where anticompeti-
tive effects seem very likely. This narrow interpretation is supported by
Continental TV., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,75 in which the Supreme
Court overturned the per se rule against territorial restrictions on
franchises. Criticizing "formalistic line drawing," the Court focused on
the need to show "demonstrable economic effect" in cases involving ver-
tical restraints.76 The elements of the per se rule are somewhat flexible;77
by adopting a more demanding standard for market power, courts can
retain the benefits of the per se rule while applying it only in cases of
truly anticompetitive behavior.
C. Proof of Economic Power in Per Se Tying Cases.
In order for a tying arrangement to be illegal per se, the seller must
have sufficient economic power in the tying product market to restrain
71. Jefferson Parish Hosp., 104 S. Ct. at 1570-74 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor
was joined in her opinion by Chief Justice Burger, and by Justices Powell and Rehnquist. Id. at
1569. Judge Feinberg has written, for example:
The tie-in field, like much of antitrust law, rests on economic assumptions that are coming
under increased scrutiny. I concur in the changed result reached by the new majority
because I agree that in view of the present case law and the current learning, it would be
unjustifiable to extend the law regarding tying to the fact pattern present here.
Shop & Save Food Mkts., Inc. v. Pneumo Corp., 683 F.2d 27, 31 (2d Cir. 1982) (Feinberg, J.,
concurring) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1038 (1983). In that case, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided on rehearing that the per se rule against tie-ins
should not apply where a "penalty" rent was charged by the defendant when the plaintiff refused to
purchase groceries from it. Id. at 30-31. The court found that anticompetitive forcing could not be
shown because the plaintiff refused to purchase the groceries-though it did pay the higher rental
charge. Id.
72. See Jefferson Parish Hosp., 104 S. Ct. at 1560-67 (discussing various prerequisites for the
application of the per se rule).
73. Id. at 1566.
74. Id. at 1566 n.46.
75. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
76. Id. at 58-59.
77. See infra notes 119 & 177 and accompanying text (rejecting mechanical legal rules in favor
of market analysis); see also United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 555-56 (E.D. Pa.
1960) (discussing the discretion available in determining whether per se rule is applicable), affd per
curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961); R. GIVENS, supra note 21, at xvii (discussing the need in antitrust law
for consideration of changing economic circumstances); R. POSNER, supra note 26, at 182-83 (calling
for limitations on liability for tying arrangements); Easterbrook, Is There a Rachet in Antitrust Law?
60 TEX. L. REV. 705, 706-10 (1982) (arguing that antitrust rules should be flexible).
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competition in the market for the tied product.78 In Data General, the
Ninth Circuit correctly indicated that tying cases do not require the de-
tailed market power analysis that is necessary, for example, in a monopo-
lization case.79 However, the court failed to recognize that the Supreme
Court has nonetheless required a strong showing of market power. Jef-
ferson Parish Hospital, for instance, held that a showing of both thirty
percent market share and imperfect consumer information "do[es] not
generate the kind of market power that justifies condemnation of ty-
ing." 80 In Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel Corp. (Fortner I), 81
the Supreme Court indicated that "the proper focus of concern is
whether the seller has the power to raise prices, or impose burdensome
terms such as a tie-in, with respect to any appreciable number of buyers
within the market. ' 82 This statement has not been read to imply that the
mere existence of a tying arrangement is sufficient to prove market
power. Rather, Fortner I and Jefferson Parish Hospital require proof of
control over price or other terms, 83 not "'market power' in some ab-
stract sense."'8 4
Evidence of this market power can include proof of dominance in
the tying product market or proof that the seller's product is sufficiently
unique to confer "some advantage not shared by [its] competitors in the
78. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
79. Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., 734 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 3534 (1985); see United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 n.4 (1962) (in tie-in case,
government need not "demonstrat[e] . . . market power in the sense of § 2 of the Sherman Act").
80. Jefferson Parish Hosp., 104 S. Ct. at 1566.
The recently issued Department of Justice guidelines for tying arrangements and other vertical
restraints provide some assistance in defining the requisite market power. See Department of Justice
Vertical Restraints Guidelines, 50 Fed. Reg. 6263 (1985). The Guidelines indicate that the Depart-
ment of Justice will not challenge a tying arrangement if the party imposing the arrangement pos-
sesses a market share of 30% or less, unless the tie-in unreasonably restrains competition under the
rule of reason. Id. at 6272. If the market share in the tying product market is greater than 30%, the
Department of Justice "will attempt to determine whether the seller has 'dominant' market power."
Id. If dominance is found and the other elements of the per se rule are present, the Guidelines view
the tie-in as illegal per se. If dominant power is not found, however, then the Department of Justice
will again apply the rule of reason. Id. In the last situation, the seller's substantial market power
will be considered in the analysis, but will not justify per se condemnation. Thus the Vertical Re-
straints Guidelines appear to track Jefferson Parish Hosp. in its market power analysis. Although
the Guidelines are not binding on private litigants or the courts, they do serve as indicators of the
government's enforcement policy. They also reflect a sound view of the circumstances where con-
demnation of tying arrangements is justified.
81. 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
82. Id. at 504; see Fortner II, 429 U.S. 610, 620 (1976).
83. See Jefferson Parish Hosp., 104 S. Ct. at 1565 ("The fact that [customers] are required to
purchase two separate items is only the beginning of the appropriate inquiry."); Fortner II, 429 U.S.
at 620 n.13 (read in context, FortnerI requires control over price) (citing Dam, supra note 66, at 25-
26).
84. Jefferson Parish Hosp., 104 S. Ct. at 1566.
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market for the tying product."8 5 Economic power can also be shown
where a substantial number of buyers have accepted the package, but
only when this fact can be explained solely by the seller's market
power.86
In Data General there was no claim that the defendant in fact domi-
nated its market. The Ninth Circuit found instead that RDOS was suffi-
ciently unique to confer the required market power on Data General.87
The court based its conclusion on several factors: (1) the distinctiveness
and desirability of RDOS, (2) the copyright on RDOS, and (3) the exist-
ence of a "lock-in." 88 The court's lock-in argument 89 is circular because
it assumes the uniqueness of Data General's software. If there are com-
patible alternatives, then Data General's customers will not be locked
into purchasing its software. 90 Moreover, two other courts have rejected
similar lock-in arguments.91
The Data General court found the uniqueness requirement fulfilled
by evidence that RDOS was "particularly desirable to a substantial
number of buyers."'92 This desirability is insufficient to show market
power unless it gives the seller economic power: the power to raise prices
by restricting output.9 3 United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises
(Fortner II)94 quotes a commentator who interprets this test to require
the following proof: "Whenever there are some buyers who find a seller's
product uniquely attractive, and are therefore willing to pay a premium
85. Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 620; see also United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962)
("Even absent a showing of market dominance, the crucial economic power may be inferred from
the tying product's desirability . . . or uniqueness. ... )
86. Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 618 n.10; Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1216
(9th Cir. 1977). One court has noted that it is circular reasoning to assume market power from the
existence of a tie-in accepted by a significant number of buyers. Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts, Inc., 531
F.2d 1211, 1224-25 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976).
87. Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., 734 F.2d 1336, 1341-43 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied, 105 S. Ct. 3534 (1985).
88. Id.
89. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of the alleged lock-in.
90. It is quite possible that compatible alternatives exist. See, eg., Enright, Preview: The
Kaypro 16, PROFILES, Feb. 1985, at 74, 74, 76 (noting ability of competing manufacturers to "clone"
IBM personal computer and operating system software without violating patent and copyright laws).
In addition, the lock-in could be avoided by conversion to a similar system. Data General II, 529 F.
Supp. 801, 814 (N.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd in part, 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 105 S. Ct.
3534 (1985).
91. One of these cases involved another challenge to Data General's marketing practices.
Warner Management Consultants, Inc. v. Data General Corp., 545 F. Supp. 956, 965-66 (N.D. Ill.
1982) (rejecting lock-in as evidence of market power). The other case involved Kodak's alleged
"technological tie" of film and cameras. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263,
285-86 (2d Cir. 1979) (monopolization case), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
92. Data General, 734 F.2d at 1341.
93. Jefferson Parish Hosp., 104 S. Ct. at 1566 & n.46; Fortner 1, 394 U.S. 495, 503-04 (1969).
94. 429 U.S. 610 (1977).
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above the price of its nearest substitute, the seller has the opportunity to
impose a tie. . . -95 In Fortner I and Fortner II, for example, the al-
leged tie-in involved extremely favorable credit terms tied to the
purchase of prefabricated housing.96 The Supreme Court reversed a find-
ing that the purportedly advantageous financing terms were sufficiently
unique or desirable to confer market power.97 The Court did not view
the fact that the financing terms were "unique and unusual" as disposi-
tive of the market power issue.98
In Data General, there was no showing of the economic power re-
quired under the Fortner II standard. The trial court described the mar-
ket as highly competitive, and it found no evidence of noncompetitive
pricing or price discrimination. 99 Moreover, the existence of a large
number of purchasers for Data General's package can be explained by
the competitiveness of the package'0° or by the efficiency of bundling the
hardware and software. 101
Evidence of economic power, or power over price, in the tying prod-
uct market is an essential element of the per se rule against tie-ins. As
noted in Jefferson Parish Hospital, once sufficient market power is
proved, the probability increases that the tie-in has anticompetitive ef-
fects.102 Thus, application of an economic test-rather than mechanical
rules-ensures that the harsh per se rule will be used only in cases where
its assumptions are justified.
D. The Presumption of Market Power Arising from Copyrights.
A major basis for imposing liability on Data General was the pre-
sumption of uniqueness, and thus market power, arising from Data Gen-
eral's copyright on its software, RDOS.103 Despite its acknowledgement
that a copyright merely creates a rebuttable presumption of economic
95. Iad at 621 n.14 (quoting Note, The Logic of Foreclosure Tie-In Doctrine After Fortner v.
U.S. Steel, 79 YALE L.J. 86, 93-94 (1969)).
96. Id. at 611; Fortner I, 394 U.S. 495, 496-97 (1969).
97. Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 620-21. The evidence of uniqueness rejected in Fortner 11 included
the following: the defendant was owned by one of the largest industrial corporations in the country;
a large number of customers purchased the package; U.S. Steel charged a "noncompetitive price" for
its homes; and the finance terms were unusual (including 100% financing). Id. at 614.
98. Id. at 621 (citing Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 505).
99. Data General II, 529 F. Supp. 801, 813-15 (N.D. Cal. 1981), rev"d in part, 734 F.2d 1336
(9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3534 (1985).
100. Id. at 815-16.
101. This point refers to the business justifications discussed infra notes 134-84 and accompany-
ing text.
102. Jefferson Parish Hosp., 104 S. Ct. at 1560-61.
103. Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., 734 F.2d 1336, 1341 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 3534 (1985); see also United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45-46 (1962) (discussing
presumption of market power arising from copyrights and patents).
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power,"°4 the Ninth Circuit effectively treated the existence of the copy-
right as conclusive evidence of market power. Specifically, the court
stated that the copyright made RDOS "unique as a matter of law," 1°5
and it was apparently unwilling to consider Data General's rebuttal on
the point. 106 In contrast, the trial court had noted the highly competitive
nature of the computer market, the existence of more than one hundred
competing brands of software, the clear availability of substitutes for
RDOS, and the complete lack of evidence that Data General had control
over price.107 It is difficult to conceive of more persuasive evidence that
Data General did not have market power. Indeed, under the Ninth Cir-
cuit's view of the issue, it is difficult to see how even the smallest com-
puter manufacturer in the country could prove that its copyright did not
give rise to market power.10 8
The Data General court's unfortunate reliance on the presumption
of market power arising from copyright can be traced to the confusing
origin and nature of that presumption. An early patent case, Motion Pic-
ture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co., 109 involved a tie-in
of patented movie projectors and films. The Court in that case applied
the doctrine of patent misuse, which penalizes a patentee's attempts to
extend the patent monopoly by requiring it to forfeit its patent rights. 110
The early patent and copyright tie-in cases cited and were influenced by
this doctrine. 11
104. Data General, 734 F.2d at 1344 ("The burden to rebut the presumption shifted to
defendant.").
105. Id. at 1342-43.
106. Id. at 1345-46.
107. Data General II, 529 F. Supp. 801, 813-16 (N.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd in part, 734 F.2d 1336
(9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3534 (1985).
108. Liability would be limited only by the requirement that a "not insubstantial" amount of
commerce be affected. This requirement is easily met. See supra note 28.
109. 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
110. See id. at 516-19. For example, the Supreme Court in 1942 applied the principles of equity
to bar a patent infringement suit where the patent holder engaged in tying. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S.
Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492-94 (1942).
111. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1572 n.7 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring):
Although United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. considered the legality of "block book-
ing" of motion pictures, which ties the purchase of rights to copyrighted motion pictures to
purchase of other motion, pictures of the same copyright holder, the Court did not analyze
the arrangement with the schema of the tying cases. Rather, the Court borrowed the pat-
ent law principle of "patent misuse," which prevents the holder of a patent from using the
patent to require his customers to purchase unpatented products.
Id. (citation omitted). In United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948), the
Supreme Court condemned block booking because the practice prevented competition on the merits
and allegedly extended the seller's copyright monopoly to other products. Id. at 156-57. "That
enlargement of the monopoly of the copyright was condemned below in reliance on the principle
which forbids the owner of a patent to condition its use on the purchase or use of patented or
unpatented materials." Id. at 157. To support these propositions, the Court included citations to
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The extension of this patent law doctrine into antitrust is troubling
because it exposes a patent holder to liability for both treble damage pen-
alties and patent law sanctions. In addition, the early copyright-antitrust
cases, United States v. Loew's Inc. 112 and United States v. Paramount Pic-
tures, Inc.,1 13 involved motion pictures that were "unique" and "non-
replicable."114 The copyrighted motion picture Gone With the Wind can
readily be described as unique, but a copyrighted computer operating
system is not unique in the same sense. Consumers are not concerned
with insignificant differences between RDOS and other operating sys-
tems. Two copyrighted software programs that are functionally
equivalent will be indistinguishable to the average consumer, whereas
two movies, even with similar plot lines, will not. 15
The Court in Loew's recognized the possibility that some tying ar-
rangements involving copyrighted or patented products would not vio-
late the antitrust laws. 116 In Data General, the Ninth Circuit did not
dispute the trial court's holding that the presumption arising from copy-
rights is rebuttable. 17 However, the court placed so much emphasis on
the existence of the copyright that the presumption was effectively ren-
dered conclusive. Indeed, the court seemed unwilling to consider the
two patent misuse cases: Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942), and Mercoid
Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944). See Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at
157; see also United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45-56 (1962) (noting that the presumption of
market power arose in the patent misuse cases); R. BORK, supra note 45, at 366 (early cases were
"decided under law of patent misuse"); W. BOWMAN, supra note 51, at 153-54, 157-58, 182 (discuss-
ing the influence of patent misuse and leverage notions on the law of tie-ins); R. POSNER, supra note
26, at 172 (same); E. SINGER, ANtITRUST ECONOMICS AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 112-13 (1981)
(same).
112. 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
113. 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
114. W. HOLMES, supra note 21, § 36.05, at 17; see Loew's, 371 U.S. at 48 (holding that the
presumption of films' uniqueness arising from copyright was confirmed by the lower court's proper
findings regarding nature of the films); Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 156-59 (applying "patent
tying" cases to block-booking practices of motion picture distributors).
115. Professor Samuelson has noted that computer programs are viewed by most users as a
"black box." See Samuelson, supra note 42, at 681-82 ("The user does not care how the program
does what it does, just that it does what it is supposed to do.").
116. See Loew's, 371 U.S. at 49-50 ("There may be rare circumstances in which the doctrine...
prohibiting tying arrangements involving patented or copyrighted tying products is inapplicable.");
see also W. HOLMES, supra note 21, § 36.05, at 15 (discussing Loew's).
117. Data General, 734 F.2d at 1344. See also Data General II, 529 F. Supp. 801, 816 (N.D.
Cal. 1981) ("[T]he existence of copyright notices generally creates a presumption of economic power
but does not conclusively presume such power."), rev'd in part on other grounds, 734 F.2d 1336 (9th
Cir. 1984), cer denied, 105 S. Ct. 3534 (1985); Data General I, 490 F. Supp. at 1113. Oddly, the
court of appeals asserted that the trial judge erred by placing the burden of proving economic power
on the plaintiffs. Data General, 734 F.2d at 1344. In fact, the trial judge instructed the jury that the
presumption arising from the copyright shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. Data General
II, 529 F. Supp. at 811.
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substantial evidence offered to rebut the presumption of market power.' 18
The Ninth Circuit's approach is inconsistent with Jefferson Parish Hospi-
tal and other Supreme Court decisions that indicate the need for a factual
showing of market power and criticize the use of mechanical legal rules
to decide complex economic questions.1 19 Given the importance of mar-
ket power as a theoretical, legal, and economic prerequisite to liability for
tying arrangements, 120 it seems unreasonable to eliminate economic
power as an issue simply because the tying product is copyrighted.
The presumption of market power arising from copyrights and pat-
ents has come under increasing criticism in recent years, both from com-
mentators 121 and from the Supreme Court. Justice O'Connor, in a
concurring opinion joined by three other members of the Court, voiced
such a concern in Jefferson Parish Hospital:
A common misconception has been that a patent or copyright ...
suffice[s] to demonstrate market power. While [this fact] might help to
give market power to a seller, it is also possible that a seller in these
situations will have no market power: for example, a patent holder has
no market power in any relevant sense if there are close substitutes for
the patented product.12 2
118. See supra notes 87-101 and accompanying text.
119. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1559, 1566 (1984); Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1977) (quoting White Motor Co. v. United
States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963)); Fortner II, 429 U.S. 610, 620-22 (1977); Fortner I, 394 U.S. 495,
503-05 (1969).
120. See supra notes 46-86 and accompanying text.
121. As Professor, now Judge, Richard Posner notes:
A patent is actually a poor proxy for monopoly power, since most patents confer too little
monopoly power to be a proper object of antitrust concern. Some patents confer no mo-
nopoly power at all. A patent may simply enable a firm to reduce the cost advantage of a
competing firm; in such a case the patent might actually reduce the amount of monopoly
power in the market. Its popularity in the tie-in cases may stem from the fact that the
earliest such cases were not antitrust cases at all. They were patent-misuse cases, where the
issue was whether the patentee had improperly extended the patent monopoly by mono-
polizing an unpatented product tied to the patented product.
R. POSNER, supra note 26, at 172 n.3 (citations and parentheses omitted). "Implicit in the presump-
tion [of market power] is the belief that since a patent or copyright is a statutory monopoly, it
follows that each must also be a market monopoly. But all patents do not confer substantial or even
significant market power." E. SINGER, supra note 111, at 112; see also D. ARMENTANO, supra note
51, at 203-05 (criticizing presumption of market power in context of International Salt); THE AT-
TORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 238 (1955) ("The
Committee feels [that]. . .the fact that the tying product is patented need not be decisive of illegal-
ity."); R. BORK, supra note 45, at 367-68 (criticizing presumption of market power). See generally
W. BOWMAN, supra note 51, at 53 (noting that patent does not necessarily confer market power).
The presumption of market power is also a manifestation of the discredited leverage theory. See
E. SINGER, supra note 11, at 112 (patent monopoly is not necessarily extended by tie-in); see also
note 51 (discussion of leverage theory).
122. Jefferson Parish Hosp., 104 S. Ct. at 1572 n.7. See generally Landes & Posner, Market
Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REv. 937 (1981).
1046 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1985:1027
In addition, it is likely that patents confer greater market power
than do copyrights. An invention is required to have some degree of
"novelty" in order to secure patent protection. 23 A copyrighted work,
on the other hand, need not meet the novelty standard.' 24 Moreover,
copyrighted material can be duplicated as long as it is not copied; a pat-
ented device cannot be duplicated at all.125 Copyright protects only the
"expression" of a computer program, not the basic idea behind the pro-
gram.' 26 The copyright monopoly thus does not prevent others from ap-
propriating the idea embodied in that program. Finally, copyright
infringers are protected by the fair use doctrine, which is not available to
patent infringers.127 "Fair use" is a privilege permitting limited and rea-
sonable use of copyrighted material.128 Thus it can be argued that the
presumption of market power arising from a copyright should be weaker
than the presumption arising in patent cases.
Courts have drawn a similar distinction with regard to trademarks.
123. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1982); see Loew's, 371 U.S. at 46 (because goal of patent laws is to reward
uniqueness, existence of patent can be used to infer uniqueness in tying cases).
124. In order to secure a statutory copyright, the author need only "originate" the work and fix
it in a tangible medium. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
125. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982) (idea/expression distinction in copyright); C. MCMANIS,
THE LAW OF UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES 239 (1982) (if two authors produce identical works inde-
pendently, i.e., without copying the work of the other, then each author may copyright his work); see
also 17 U.S.C. § 405(b) (1982) (no liability for innocent infringer when copyright notice has been
omitted and infringer has not received actual notice that the material has been registered); 17 U.S.C.
§ 504(c)(2) (1982) (exemption from statutory damages for innocent infringement by non-profit edu-
cational institutions or public broadcasters). Judge Hand explained the patent/copyright distinction
as follows:
To sustain [a finding of copyright infringement] ...more must appear than the mere
similarity, or even identity, of the supposed infringement with the part in question. In this
lies one distinction between a patent and a copyright. One may infringe a patent by the
innocent reproduction of the machine patented, but the law imposes no prohibition upon
those who, without copying, independently arrive at the precise combination of words or
notes which have been copyrighted.
Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1924). Judge Hand developed this same
principle, twelve years later, into his memorable fantasy of the recreation of Keats's "Ode on a
Grecian Urn": "[I]f by some magic a man who had never known it were to compose anew Keats's
Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an 'author,' and, if he copyrighted it, others might not copy that
poem, though they might of course copy Keats's." Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81
F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936).
126. See Samuelson, supra note 42, at 754-55.
127. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982) (copyright fair use provision).
128. "Fair use" has been defined as a privilege permitting the reasonable and justifiable use of
copyrighted material without the consent of the copyright holder. Rosemont Enters. v. Random
House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967). Section 107 of the
Copyright Act of 1976 mandates that four factors be considered in determining whether a use is fair:
the purpose and character of the use, the nature of the copyrightbd work, the amount and substanti-
ality of the taking, and the effect of the use on the market for the copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. § 107
(1982).
TYING ARRANGEMENTS
In Carpa, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 129 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit held that trademarks are only persuasive evidence of
market power. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit has concluded that trademarks merely serve to identify the
franchisor, and that proof of actual economic power is therefore still re-
quired. 130 Other courts have recognized that the mere presence of a
trademark does not prove actual economic power, and have therefore
rejected any presumption of market power flowing from the presence of a
trademark.' 31 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit has held that a trademark
creates the same presumption of market power as does a patent or a
copyright.'3 2 The approach of the Second and Fifth Circuits is sounder
because it recognizes that a legal right does not necessarily confer eco-
nomic power. This pragmatic analysis should be applied in copyright
cases.
There is no precedent establishing that copyrights create an irrebut-
table presumption of market power. 133 A product that meets the statu-
tory requirements for copyrightability may not possess the qualities
necessary to create a market success. Given the important role of market
power in finding antitrust violations, a copyright should at most give rise
to a rebuttable presumption. Indeed, it can be argued that the copyright
should merely be persuasive evidence of economic power. In any case,
the defendant should be allowed to prove that it does not have the ability
to raise prices or impose other burdensome terms on its customers.
IV. "REDEEMING VIRTUES": BUSINESS JUSTIFICATIONS FOR TIE-INS
Although labeled a "per se" violation of the antitrust laws, tying
arrangements have generally not been deemed illegal without some con-
129. 536 F.2d 39, 48 (5th Cir. 1976).
130. Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d 658, 663-65 (2d Cir. 1974); Susser v.
Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 519-21 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed, 381 U.S. 125 (1965).
131. See United States v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 517 F. Supp. 1369, 1386-87 (N.D. Cal.
1981) (holding that although the Ninth Circuit allows a presumption in some circumstances, trade-
mark alone is not sufficient to prove market leverage); Q. T. Mkts., Inc. v. Fleming Cos., 394 F.
Supp. 1102, 1109 (D. Colo. 1975) (where plaintiff cannot show any factor in addition to mere exist-
ence of trademark, no presumption of coercive market power is justified); Golden West Insulation,
Inc. v. Stardust Investment Corp., 47 Or. App. 493, 501-04, 615 P.2d 1048, 1053-54 (1980) (applying
Oregon antitrust law) (a trademark "alone cannot create a presumption of sufficient economic power
over the market for the tying product"); see also Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 524 F.2d 1054, 1057 (10th
Cir. 1975) (rejecting application of per se rule on grounds that a trademark is not a separate product
for purposes of two product requirement), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 912 (1976).
132. Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 50 (9th Cir. 1971) (registered trademark
presents legal barrier against competition), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
133. See Data General 1, 490 F. Supp. 1089, 1112 (N.D. Cal. 1980) ("[T]he sole fact of the
existence of a copyright notice has not been held to be sufficient to prove economic power."), affid in
relevant part, 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3534 (1985).
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sideration of business justifications. 134 Despite the often cited assertion
that "tying arrangements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppres-
sion of competition,"' 135 tie-ins may have a number of beneficial effects.
First, a tie-in may be used to facilitate the introduction of a new prod-
uct.136 Second, it can be used to evade price monitoring by cartels. 137
Three other possible purposes are the protection of goodwill, 38 the cap-
ture of economies of joint production and distribution, 39 and the elimi-
nation of the free rider problem.1t4  Defenses based upon the goodwill,
efficiency, and free rider theories were rejected at an early stage in the
Data General litigation.' 4 ' The trial court rejected those justifications
because such defenses are available only in limited circumstances and are
accepted only when there are no "less restrictive alternatives" to the ty-
ing arrangement. 42
134. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
135. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949), quoted in Northern Pac.
Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958).
136. The most famous case discussing the "new industry" defense is United States v. Jerrold
Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 555-60 (E.D. Pa. 1960) (tie-in is reasonable when used to facilitate
development of new line of business), af'dper curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961). See Continental T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977) (discussing use of tie-ins to facilitate development
of emerging markets or new technologies); Northern v. McGraw-Edison Co., 542 F.2d 1336, 1347
(8th Cir. 1976) (same), cert. denied sub nom. McGraw-Edison Co. v. Soper, 429 U.S. 1097 (1977);
Carpa, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 536 F.2d 39,47 (5th Cir. 1976) (same); ABA ANTITRUST SECTION,
supra note 21, at 89-90 (discussing the new product defense); ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONO-
GRAPH No. 8, VERTICAL RESTRICTIONS UPON BUYERS LIMITING PURCHASES OF GOODS FROM
OTHERS 12, 20-21 (1982) (same) [hereinafter cited as ABA MONOGRAPH]; C. HILLS, supra note 21,
at 108-09 (same); W. HOLMES, supra note 21, § 34.03 (same); Note, Newcomer Defenses: Reasonable
Use of Tie-ins, Franchises, Territorials and Exclusives, 18 STAN. L. REV. 457, 458-65 (1966) (same).
Similarly, a tying arrangement might aid a new entrant in an established market; "[tie-ins. . . may
facilitate new entry into fields where established sellers have wedded their customers to them by ties
of habit and custom." Fortner 1, 394 U.S. 495, 514 n.9 (1969) (White, J., dissenting), quoted in
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1573 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring);
see GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 55 (discussing use of tie-in by new manufacturer); White Motor Co. v.
United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963) (same); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 330
(1962) (same); Easterbrook, supra note 45, at 149-50 (discussing increase in product variety resulting
from entry of firm using vertical restraint) (citing Douglas & Miller, Quality Competition, Industry
Equilibrium, and Efficiency in the Price-Constrained Airline Market, 64 AM. ECON. REv. 657, 668
(1974) and Scherer, The Economics of Vertical Restraints, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 687, 704 (1983)).
137. See Fortner I, 394 U.S. 495, 514 n.9 (1969) (White, J., dissenting) (tie-in "may permit
clandestine price cutting" thus lessening threat of retaliation by cartel), cited in Jefferson Parish
Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1573-74 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Easterbrook,
supra note 45, at 146 (tie-in may enable firm to cheat in cartelized market).
138. See infra notes 153-77 and accompanying text.
139. See infra notes 178-84 and accompanying text.
140. See infra note 181.
141. Data General 1, 490 F. Supp. 1089, 1120-1124 (N.D. Cal. 1980), aJJ'd in relevant part, 734
F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3534 (1985).
142. Id. at 1120 (quoting Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 51 (9th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972)); see also Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1217 (9th
Cir. 1977) (justifications for tie-ins available only in limited circumstances).
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The trial court's view of business justifications seems to conflict with
the rationale of the Supreme Court's decision in GTE Sylvania.143 Over-
turning the per se rule against territorial restrictions on franchises, the
Court in that case focused upon the "redeeming virtues" of vertical re-
strictions.144 The redeeming virtues discussed in GTE Sylvania-facilita-
tion of new businesses, protection of goodwill, efficient marketing, and
the elimination of the free rider problem145-are as relevant to tying
cases as they are to territorial restrictions. As the Supreme Court indi-
cated in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 14 6 "the economic ef-
fect of. . . unilateral and concerted vertical price-setting, agreements on
price and non-price restrictions. . . is in many, but not all, cases similar
or identical."' 147 Justice White, in his concurrence in GTE Sylvania,
noted that the distinction between price and non-price vertical restraints
"may be as difficult to justify as that [made by] Schwinn.'"148
Tying law can therefore be reconciled with GTE Sylvania in two
ways. First, the per se rule against tying arrangements can be elimi-
nated.' 49 Alternatively, courts can give greater attention to business jus-
tifications under the partial per se rule.150 Although the former
approach was rejected in Jefferson Parish Hospital, 151 the Supreme Court
did not address the argument that business justifications should be con-
strued more broadly.1-52 This section reviews two business justifications
that may be applicable to the Data General case in light of GTE Sylvania
and Jefferson Parish Hospital.
A. The Goodwill Defense.
The goodwill defense rests upon the fact that a manufacturer's prod-
uct might not function properly when used in conjunction with a compo-
nent manufactured by another firm. The other firm's component may be
defective or simply incompatible. Manufacturers of complex devices
thus have an incentive to sell two complementary products as a package
in order to avoid consumer dissatisfaction. By using a tie-in, the manu-
143. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
144. Id. at 54.
145. Id. at 54-55.
146. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
147. Id. at 762; see C. HILLS, supra note 21, at 159-61 (Supp. 1983) (discussing relevance of GTE
Sylvania to tying arrangement law).
148. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 70 (White, J., concurring).
149. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of the partial per se rule.
151. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
152. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1564 n.39, 1565 n.42
(1984).
1049Vol. 1985:1027]
1050 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1985:1027
facturer is able to maintain its goodwill and reputation.15 3 For example,
in Pick Manufacturing Co. v. General Motors Corp., 154 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld GM's requirement that
its dealers sell and install only genuine GM parts. The arrangement was
viewed as an attempt to avoid harm to GM's goodwill.155 A tie-in of a
patented silo unloader and patented silos was upheld in Dehydrating Pro-
cess Co. v. A. 0. Smith Corp. 156 In that case the tying arrangement was
instituted after customers complained of malfunctions when other silos
were used. 157 The Supreme Court has also noted that federal and state
laws impose safety and quality requirements on firms, giving them an-
other reason to maintain quality standards. 15 8
Defendants who raise the goodwill justification must show that
there are no less restrictive alternatives available. In other words, the tie-
153. See GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 55 & n.23 (discussing use of vertical restraints to maintain
goodwill); R. BORK, supra note 45, at 379-80 (praising the goodwill defense in tying cases); W.
BOWMAN, supra note 51, at 173-76 (discussing goodwill defense).
154. 80 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1935), affd per curiam, 299 U.S. 3 (1936).
155. Id. at 644; see Fortner 1, 394 U.S. 495, 514 n.9 (1969) (tie-in "may protect the reputation of
the tying product if failure to use the tied product in conjunction with it may cause it to misfunc-
tion"), quoted in Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1574 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring); W. BOWMAN, supra note 51, at 174-75 (discussing Pick and related
cases); see also TAP, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., 571 F. Supp. 262, 267 (D.N.J. 1983) (apply-
ing Pick in analogous suit involving Mercedes-Benz). But see Metrix Warehouse, Inc., v. Daimler-
Benz Aktiengesellschaft, 1984-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,226, at 66,947 (D. Md. 1984) (suggesting
that Pick is inconsistent with Jefferson Parish Hosp.). A number of cases have upheld goodwill
justifications for tying arrangements. See, e.g., Baker v. Simmons Co., 307 F.2d 458 (Ist Cir. 1962)
(upholding tie-in to maintain trademark holder's goodwill), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 820 (1965); see
also ABA MONOGRAPH, supra note 136, at 12-13, 18-20 (discussing the goodwill justification); C.
HILLS, supra note 21, at 109-13 (same). Goodwill was also one of the considerations in United
States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 556-60 (E.D. Pa. 1960) (discussing good will and
new industry justifications), afi'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961). See Austin, The Tying Arrange.
ment: A Critique and Some New Thoughts, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 88, 122 (arguing that Jerrold is based
on a combination of goodwill, single product, and new industry defenses); see also Jefferson Parish
Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. at 1570 n.1 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (discussing Jerrold as a
goodwill case).
156. 292 F.2d 653, 656-67 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961).
157. Id. at 654; see W. BOWMAN, supra note 51, at 175-76 (discussing Dehydrating Process and
related cases).
158. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 55 n.23; see Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932, 936-39 (3d
Cir.) (allowing tie-in intended to avoid product liability suits), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970).
Governing federal provisions include the Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-83
(1982) (safety regulations), and the Consumer Product Warranties Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12 (1982)
(warranty obligations); see J. INMAN, THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT OF BUSINESS 541-71
(1984) (discussing state and federal safety requirements), R. MEINERS & A. RINGLEB, THE LEGAL
ENVIRONMENT OF BUSINESS 98-175 (1982) (discussing state and federal quality and safety require-
ments); L. STERN & T. EOVALDI, LEGAL AsPECTs OF MARKETING STRATEGY 76-116 (1984) (dis-
cussing numerous legal rules that mandate product quality and safety).
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in must be "fairly necessary" to protect goodwill. 5 9 For example, in
International Business Machines v. United States, 160 IBM claimed that its
requirement that only IBM computer cards be used with its tabulating
machine was intended to prevent malfunctions resulting from the use of
inferior cards.1 61 The Supreme Court rejected the defense because a less
restrictive alternative was available: IBM could provide consumers with
quality specifications for the tabulating cards.1 62 Defendants seeking to
justify a tie-in must therefore show that either quality specifications
"would be so detailed that they could not practicably be supplied,"1 63 or
the use of quality specifications would reveal trade secrets. 164 In Data
General, the trial court acknowledged that quality specifications would
be inadequate and would result in disclosure of trade secrets. 165 There
are at least three ways to distinguish Data General from cases where
quality specifications are adequate. The first is that specifications for
compatible computer hardware are probably too detailed to be reason-
able. 166 In addition, as the court noted, specifications might reveal trade
secrets. 167 Finally, Data General's sales are often made to middlemen
who may not pass on the specifications to final purchasers.168
159. Principe v. McDonald's Corp., 631 F.2d 303, 311 (4th Cir. 1980) (franchisor's tie-in upheld
as necessary to franchising process), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970 (1981); Anderson v. AAA, 454 F.2d
1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1972) ("fairly necessary" test for vertical restrictions); see also infra note 162.
160. 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
161. Id. at 138-39. The purpose of the tie-in in IBM may well have bden "metering" of demand
as part of a price discrimination scheme. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
162. IBM Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 139-40 (1936). The availability of product speci-
fications as a less restrictive alternative is frequently the rationale for rejecting goodwill justifications.
See, eg., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949); International Salt Co. v.
United States, 332 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1947); Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1217
(9th Cir. 1977).
163. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949); see Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins
Ice Cream Co., 664 F.2d 1348, 1353 (9th Cir. 1982) (discussing less restrictive alternatives to tying
arrangements); Principe v. McDonald's Corp., 631 F.2d 303, 308-11 (4th Cir. 1980) (same), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 970 (1981); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 50-52 (9th Cir. 1971)
(same), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972); Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 519-20 (2d Cir. 1964)
(same), cert. dismissed, 381 U.S. 125 (1965); Dehydrating Process Co. v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 292
F.2d 653, 656 (Ist Cir.) ("It may be assumed. . . that defendant did not readily escape claims, or
the consequent injury to its reputation, by telling its customers that the fault was theirs."), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961).
164. See Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 51 n.9 (9th Cir. 1971) (goodwill justifica-
tion might be accepted if specifications would reveal trade secrets), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
165. Data General I, 490 F. Supp. 1089, 1121 (N.D. Cal. 1980), aff'd in part, 734 F.2d 1336 (9th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3534 (1985).
166. See supra note 163; cf IBM Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 139-40 (1936) (specifica-
tion of computer cards found to be reasonable alternative).
167. See supra note 164.
168. Compare Data General II, 529 F. Supp. 801, 805 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (noting that Data Gen-
eral's customers resell completed computer systems to end users), rev'd in part, 734 F.2d 1336 (9th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3534 (1985), and Pick Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 80 F.2d
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Although the evidence adduced by Data General might be viewed as
proof that its tie-in was fairly necessary to protect its goodwill,169 the
court proceeded to suggest a different less restrictive alternative. It
held-without citing any case authority-that Data General could offer
"lesser warranties" or "decline to provide service" when its software was
used with hardware made by other firms. 170 The fact that the limited
warranty might be more costly to consumers was not considered.17' Nor
was the effectiveness of the alternatives discussed.172 Indeed either.
scheme suggested by the court could harm Data General's goodwill more
than would the use of incompatible hardware. The notion that providing
lesser warranties or denying service would protect Data General's good-
will is, at a minimum, counterintuitive. Warranties and product service
are methods of protecting goodwill because they can prevent buyers from
becoming dissatisfied. Limitations on post-purchase service are likely to
harm a company's reputation and goodwill, if not lead to legal action by
consumers.' 73 Moreover, warranties are signals to buyers; buyers view
generous warranties as an assurance of product quality and reliability. 174
Consumer protection laws also constrain a manufacturer's ability to limit
warranties.' 75 As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit has noted:
Application of the rigid "no less restrictive alternative" test ... would
place an undue burden on the ordinary conduct of business. Entrepre-
neurs . . . would then be made guarantors that the imaginations of
lawyers could not conjure up some method of achieving the business
purpose in question that would result in a somewhat lesser restriction
of trade. And courts would be placed in the position of second-guess-
ing business judgments as to what arrangements would or would not
provide "adequate" protection for legitimate commercial interests.176
639, 642 (7th Cir. 1935) (GM sold parts to dealers who installed them in GM cars) with IBM Corp.
v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 139-40 (1936) (IBM can "[proclaim] the virtues of its own cards or
[warn] against" use of other cards).
169. See generally supra note 159.
170. Data General I, 490 F. Supp. 1089, 1121 (N.D. Cal. 1980), afj'd in relevant part, 734 F.2d
1336 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3534 (1985).
171. Id. ("[C]osts could simply be passed along to consumers who choose an unbundled, lesser
warranty option.").
172. Cf supra note 163 (citing cases where less restrictive alternatives were regarded as
impractical).
173. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
174. See Whitford, Comment on a Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 91 YALE L.J.
1371, 1373, 1379-80 (1982) (discussing the signal theory). But cf Gerner & Bryant, Appliance War-
ranties as a Market Signal? 15 J. CONSUMER AFF. 75, 78-79 (1981) (contending that consumers
generally look with favor on the existence of warranties but rarely spend much time and energy
evaluating specific warranty provisions).
175. See supra note 158.
176. American Motor Inns v. Holiday Inns, 521 F.2d 1230, 1249-50 (3d Cir. 1975). One com-
mentator has noted that Data General is "[ain example of the extent to which courts' belief in the
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In GTE Sylvania, the Supreme Court highlighted the need to focus on
demonstrable economic effect, not "formalistic line drawing."' 77 By ig-
noring the possibility that "lesser warranties" are inferior to tie-ins as a
means of protecting goodwill, the Data General court failed to adhere to
Supreme Court precedent.
B. Economies of Joint Production and Sale.
The joint production and sale of two products may result in substan-
tial cost savings to consumers. As noted in GTE Sylvania, these savings
occur because a tying arrangement may promote "marketing effi-
ciency."17  An auto manufacturer, for instance, "ties" the various com-
ponents of a car in order to create a substantial efficiency gain. 179 Where
this is the case, courts sometimes characterize the package as one prod-
uct and thus hold that the two-product requirement is not met. 180 Simi-
supposed availability of less restrictive alternatives will be carried." C. HILLS, supra note 21, at 157
(Supp. 1983). The tendency of courts to suggest speculative or inadequate alternatives to tying ar-
rangements has been criticized by several commentators. See, eg., R. BORK, supra note 45, at 380
("There is no showing that . . . alternative routes will be as effective as the tie-in of the related
product, or that they will accomplish the result as inexpensively."); R. POSNER, supra note 26, at
175-76 (specifications alternative is often less efficient than tie-in).
177. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977).
178. Id. at 55; see Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1573 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("When the economic advantages of joint packaging are substantial the
package is not appropriately viewed as two products, and that should be the end of the tying in-
quiry."). Cost savings are particularly likely when the two products "are used in fixed proportions."
ABA MONOGRAPH, supra note 136, at 26. It is thus possible to contrast Data General I, 490 F.
Supp. 1089, 1104 (N.D. Cal. 1980), affid in part, 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 3534 (1985), where the tied hardware and software were used in fixed proportions, with IBM
Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 133-34 (1936), where the tabulating cards were not used in
fixed proportions.
179. This example is noted in R. BORK, supra note 45, at 378-79.
180. The existence of two separate products is one of the defining elements of tying arrange-
ments. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1563 (1984) (discussing
"two product" requirement); see also supra note 23 and accompanying text. Many cases have fo-
cused on the separate product issue where the tie-in produced efficiencies of joint production and
sale. See ABA MONOGRAPH, supra note 136, at 26 (tie-in of advertising in morning and afternoon
newspapers characterized as one product) (citing Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States,
345 U.S. 594, 613-15 (1953)); see also Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551,
1573 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("When the economic advantages of joint packaging are
substantial the package is not appropriately viewed as two products ...."); Hirsh v. Martindale-
Hubbell, Inc., 674 F.2d 1343, 1347-49 (9th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 973 (1982); Siegel v.
Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 48 (9th Cir. 1971) (same), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972);
Associated Press v. Taft-Ingalls Corp., 340 F.2d 753, 759-64 (6th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
820 (1965); United States v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 517 F. Supp. 1369, 1379-81 (N.D. Cal.
1981) (same); R. BORK, supra note 45, at 379 (noting that courts have attempted to deal with econo-"
mies of scale by characterizing package as one product). The district court in Data General also
noted potential cost savings in its discussion of the two-product issue. Data General I, 490 F. Supp.
1089, 1104-07 (N.D. Cal. 1980), aff'd in part, 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
3534 (1985).
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larly, in two blanket licensing cases, the courts have assumed that such
an arrangement results in the creation of a single, new product. 81
181. A blanket license gives the licensee the right to perform or use all of the copyrighted com-
positions in the licensor's repertoire. Blanket licensing is not a classic tie-in because it involves no
actual conditioning or "tying" of two products. After all revenues from the blanket licensing are
collected, they are allocated to particular compositions based on actual use. The most famous anti-
trust challenge to this practice alleged that it constituted price fixing in violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 6 (1979). Noting the "substantial lowering
of costs" and the fact that the blanket license "is, to some extent, a different product," the Supreme
Court refused to apply the per se rule to BMI. Id. at 21-25. In F.E.L. Publications, Ltd. v. Catholic
Bishop, 214 U.S.P.Q. 409 (7th Cir. 1982), a copyright infringement action, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit invoked BMI when it refused to characterize the blanket licensing
of religious songs as an unlawful tying arrangement. Id. at 413-16; see also Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
Moor-Law, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 758 (D. Del. 1981) (refusing to characterize blanket licensing as a tie-
in), affld without opinion, 691 F.2d 490 (3d Cir. 1982) and 691 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1982). The court,
focusing on the efficiencies of blanket licensing, concluded that the practice created a unique prod-
uct. F.E.L. Publications, 214 U.S.P.Q. at 413-14. The Supreme Court likewise focused upon 1he
curing of market imperfections when it upheld the Chicago Board of Trade's "Call rule" against a
section 1 price fixing challenge. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 240-41 (1918)
(Call rule "improve[d] market conditions"); see also NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948,
2960-62 (1984) (refusing to apply per se rule against price fixing where the restraint was necessary to
create the product in question).
A related business justification sometimes raised in tie-in cases is the "free rider" defense. For a
general introduction to the free rider/public good problem, see J. HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY
AND APPLICATIONS 561-64 (2d ed. 1980). Data General, for example, claimed that it needed to
bundle its hardware and software in order to recoup its investment in software research and develop-
ment. Data General I, 490 F. Supp. 1089, 1121-22 (N.D. Cal. 1980), affid in part, 734 F.2d 1336
(9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied 105 S. Ct. 3534 (1985). As one trade journal pointed out after the
decision in Data General:
[T]here will be little incentive for a company to invest the money necessary to develop a
unique or innovative [computer] system. Competitors will simply wait to see how commer-
cially successful the system is. If it is a "hit," there will be a flood of "compatible" prod-
ucts, all piggybacking on the software R&D done by the innovator. If it is a "flop," then
the competitors will turn elsewhere, leaving the innovator to shoulder the loss.
Appellate Court Reinstates Antitrust Verdict Against Data General, ScoTr REPORT, June 1984, at 1,
6; see Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1984) (discussing free rider
problem in resale price maintenance context); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S.
36, 55 (1977) ("Because of market imperfections such as the so-called 'free rider' effect. . .services
might not be provided by retailers in a purely competitive situation, despite the fact that each re-
tailer's benefit would be greater if all provided the services than if none did."); Berkey Photo, Inc. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 281 (2d Cir. 1979) (monopolization case) ("If a firm that has
engaged in the risks and expenses of research and development were required in all circumstances to
share with its rivals the benefits of those endeavors, [creative] incentives would very likely be viti-
ated."), cerL denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980); Moor-Law, 527 F. Supp. at 763 (discussing free rider
problem in blanket licensing context); see also ABA MONOGRAPH, supra note 136, at 25 (discussing,
in tying arrangement context, "reallocat[ion] of costs or profits" justification derived from Fortner
11); Easterbrook, supra note 45, at 146 (discussing role of tying arrangements in facilitating innova-
tion); Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 263, 307-12
(1981) (tie-in enables firm to recoup investment in information); Lipsky, Current Antitrust Division
Views on Patent Licensing Practices, 50 ANTITRUST L.J. 515, 518 (1982) (same). A "free rider"
defense would thus be consistent with the copyright law's goal of encouraging innovation in com-
puter technology. See Samuelson, supra note 42, at 671 n.26; see also R. BOWKER, COPYRIGHT: ITS
HISTORY AND ITs LAW 59 (1912) (quoting Senator O.M. Platt) ("The very essence of copyright is
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Although it is true that efficiency gains are considered during analy-
sis of the separate products issue, 182 the complex and confusing tests ap-
plied at that stage of a case may not adequately account for the benefits
of the tying arrangement. 18 3 Given the consumer welfare-efficiency goal
of antitrust law and the concern for "redeeming virtues" in GTE Sylva-
nia, 184 the courts should analyze economies of joint production and sale
as an affirmative defense.
V. CONCLUSION
The legal proscriptions against tying arrangements have received in-
creasing criticism in recent years. Commentators viewing the problem
from the economic perspective have been particularly critical of the
mechanistic nature of the law. First, in the interest of judicial economy,
courts often seem unwilling to delve into complex questions such as mar-
ket power. Second, the courts' uncritical adherence to precedent often
causes them to apply economic reasoning that has long been discredited
by economists.
These problems are illustrated in Data General. The partial per se
rule of tying arrangements requires a showing of actual economic power.
The Data General court, however, seemed unwilling to analyze evidence
tending to disprove market power. Instead the court sought to rely upon
the privilege of controlling the market[, because t]hat is the only way in which a man's property in
the works of his brain can be assured.").
182. See supra note 180.
183. The legal test for determining whether there are one or two products "turns not on the
functional relation between them, but rather on the character of the demand for the two items."
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1562 (1984). This standard has been
criticized by several commentators. See Dam, supra note 66, at 19 (noting abstract nature of two-
product analysis), quoted in Jefferson Parish Hosp., 104 S. Ct. at 1563 n.33; see also ABA ANTI-
TRUST SECTION, supra note 21, at 79 ("Courts generally have examined whether separate products
exist on a case-by-case basis without attempting to set forth a systematic standard for making this
determination.") (footnote omitted); ABA MONOGRAPH, supra note 136, at 5-8 (noting that test
involves "a normative rather than objective inquiry" and discussing various factors that courts con-
sider); R. BORK, supra note 45, at 378-79 (criticizing one-product, two-product distinction); C.
HILLS, supra note 21, at 207-09 (W. Liebeler ed. Supp. 1984) (criticizing standards used in determin-
ing separate-products issue). As Posner notes:
WVe think of a mimeograph machine and its paper and ink as separate products which if
sold together are "tied," but we do not think of a left and right glove, or an automobile and
its radiator, in the same way. Yet nothing in the traditional legal thinking about tie-ins
enables one to distinguish among these cases. . . . I suppose what keeps the doctrine from
expanding to its logical limits is a tacit assumption that the more obvious combination sales
could be readily justified by their lower costs. . . .But there is something seriously wrong
about a doctrine under which virtually every combination sale is prima facie an unlawful
tie-in . . ..
R. POSNER, supra note 26, at 181.
184. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54-55 (1977); see also supra
note 45.
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the existence of a copyright, vague generalizations about the "special at-
traction of RDOS," and the presence of a "lock in."' 8 5 Further, the
court relied on the unsound leverage or transfer-of-power theory. 8 6
Almost any firm in the computer industry that sells hardware and
software as a package would be liable for treble damages under the Data
General court's presumption of economic power, its minimal require-
ment as to market power, and its rapid dismissal of business justifica-
tions. The same threat of liability would exist regardless of the size of the
firm, as long as it held a copyright or a patent on the tying product.
Under the Data General approach, the competitive nature of the com-
puter industry would be ignored, and even the most persuasive business
justifications might be rejected. This result would indeed be harsh. More
importantly, it would be a result that is inconsistent with the main goal
of the antitrust laws: improving consumer welfare by fostering competi-
tion.
Gary Myers
185. Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., 734 F.2d 1336, 1341-43 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied, 105 S. Ct. 3534 (1985).
186. See, e.g.. id. at 1340.
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